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  Abstract 
Literature in law and political science has suggested a number of factors explaining 
choices on the implementation constitutional review. However, so far little is known 
about how such factors combine in order to lead to different models of review. With the 
aid of configurational research, this article sheds light on that question for all countries 
of the current EU-28. In this region, the Kelsenian model of specialized courts, the 
system of review by the judicial branch, and the model of parliamentary sovereignty 
still nowadays coexist. This article shows that phenomena such as the type of legal 
family of the country, existence of authoritarian backgrounds or political fragmentation 
played a major role in choices of models of constitutional review. However, it was only 
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By ‘constitutional review’ academic and political discourses refer to the capacity of 
judicial-type organs to overturn legislation deemed to be in contradiction with the 
national constitution. Although constitutional review is one of the most modern features 
of constitutional systems1, in the last decades it has experienced an exponential growth 
world-wide and consolidated as an essential practice in most democracies.2 
Constitutional review of legislation is characterized, however, by diversity of models 
and approaches. In a relatively small and politically homogenous area such as the 
European Union, three main approaches to review of legislation coexist: the Kelsenian 
model of concentrated review by one specialized court, the model of diffuse review of 
legislation by the judicial branch, and the model of parliamentary sovereignty in which 
constitutional review is generally forbidden.  
Constitutional review has attracted a great deal of attention, especially in the fields of 
law and politics. From a theoretical perspective, scholars have often debated the 
                                                          
1  A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’ (2002) 25 West European 
Politics 77. 
2  F. Ramos Romeu, ‘The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study of 128 Democratic 
Constitutions’ (2006) 2 Aus. Rev. of Law and Economics 103, at 103; S. Gardbaum, ‘Separation of 
Powers and the Growth of Judicial Rev. in Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of 
Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn From Sale?)’ (2014) 62 Am. J. of Comparative Law 613, 
at 614; T. Ginsburg and Versteeg, ‘Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Rev.?’ (2013) 30 J. of Law 
Economics and Organization 587, at 587. 
normative problems associated with the relation between constitutional review and 
democracy.3 Doctrinal research has made a great effort to describe, classify and analyze 
the different systems of review world-wide.4 From an empirical and causal perspective, 
Judicial Politics literature has made an essential contribution to the understanding of a 
wide range of topics, such as judicial decision-making, judicial independence, inter-
court relations and so on.5  
The question of the choices on different models of constitutional review has specific 
implications. In the political and sometimes academic arenas, the different models of 
constitutional review are usually justified through normative claims about the need to 
ensure the rule of law, their contribution to the achievement of better policy outcomes, 
or their role in the defense of constitutional rights of citizens.6 The existence of these 
narratives shows the political importance of constitutional review. Systems of 
constitutional review are central elements of political edifices. They constraint political 
actors, influence political processes and affect policy outcomes. In fact, it is a priori 
paradoxical for politicians to create these systems of constitutional review that 
ultimately constraint their own power. By understanding the reasons behind the choices 
on concrete models of review that political actors make, we can shed light over this 
paradox and understand an important aspect of political behavior and decision-making 
                                                          
3 Inter alia J. Waldron,  ‘The core of the case against judicial Rev.’ (2006) 115 Yale Law J. 1346; D. 
Kyritsis, ‘Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy’. (2012) 32 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 
297. 
4 Inter alia, M. Cappelletti and J.C. Adams, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and 
Adaptations’ (1965-1966) 79 Harvard Law Rev. 1207; V. Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and 
Democratic Values (2009); M. De Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Perspective 
(2014).  
5 Inter alia, K. Alter, ‘Explaining National Courts Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A 
Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ i  The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context, ed. A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet 
and J.H.H. Weiler (1997) 227; G. Vanberg, ‘Legislative- Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach 
to Constitutional Review’ (2001) 45 Am. J. of Political Science. 346. 
6 See inter alia M. Kumm, ‘Democracy is Not Enough: Rights, Proportionality and the Point of Judicial 
Review’ (2009) NYU School of Law Research Paper No. 09-10; A. Dyevre, ‘Technocracy and Distrust: 
Revisiting the Rationale for Constitutional Review’ (2015) 13 International J. of Constitutional Law 30. 
in the context of constitutional politics. Furthermore, we can complement the normative 
debates about the merits of each model of review with evidence about the actual reasons 
behind their implementation. 
So far, empirical research on this topic is scarce. Some works have tried to explore the 
question of choices on models of review in case studies or using qualitative 
approaches.7  Other authors have used quantitative approaches, in order to try to 
understand the variables that explain the decision either to implement constitutional 
review or not8, or the option for the constitutional court model.9 However, given the 
methodology employed by these articles, we do not know much yet about how different 
factors combine to produce particular outcomes in specific cases. Likewise, to the best 
of this author’s knowledge, little or nothing is known about the reasons behind the 
adoption of the other approach to constitutional review in Europe: the model of diffuse 
review. 
Relying on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), this research fills in that gap for 
the current constitutions of all EU Member States. In contrast with existing literature on 
the topic, which is based on correlational approaches, QCA allows for the identification 
of conditions which are necessary but not sufficient for the production of an outcome 
(in the case of this article, the implementation of a certain approach to constitutional 
review in a country), as well as the combinations of conditions which suffice to produce 
such outcome. 
The article provides for a hypothetical-deductive model capable of explaining the 
combinations of factors that lead to the choice for the centralized form of constitutional 
                                                          
7  See M. Shapiro,  ‘The Success of Judicial Review and Democracy’ in On Law, Politics and 
Judicialization ed. M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet (2002) 149.; A. Stone Sweet, ‘Why Europe Rejected 
Am. Judicial Review: And Why It May Not Matter’ (2003) 101 Michigan Law Rev. 2744.  
8 A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (1999).; Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2.  
9 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2.  
review. Additionally, it inductively explains the choices for the systems of diffuse 
review and parliamentary sovereignty. Bridging different theories and strands of 
literature, it will be shown that these choices are the result of the interaction between 
different political and socio-legal phenomena.  
The findings suggest that the Kelsenian model relies heavily in the presence of romano-
germanic legal families, but only in their combination with factors such as authoritarian 
backgrounds or political fragmentation. Said in more precise QCA terminology, a 
romano-germanic legal system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
creation of a specialized constitutional review court. This logic of necessity, uncovered 
by QCA, qualifies existing knowledge about the impact of legal families on 
constitutional review. The analyses also showed that when the conditions leading to the 
creation of Kelsenian courts were not present, countries opted either for the model of 
parliamentary sovereignty or the model of diffuse review, depending on whether 
incentives to the creation of some system of constitutional review existed at all or not. 
For instance, so far we knew very little about the specific causation of the model of 
diffuse review. The analyses in this paper suggest that this model was often 
implemented when constitutional review had generalized in the continent, but in 
countries where the rest of conditions for the creation of a Kelsenian court did not 
concur.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the 
theoretical framework of the research and some configurational hypotheses will be 
presented. Next, I will explain the selection of sources, methodology and calibration, 
paying special attention to crisp-sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). 
Subsequently, the analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions will be showed. The 
last section concludes.  
 
UNDERSTANDING CHOICES ON MODELS OF CONSTITUTIOAL REVIEW. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Configurational research allows for an intense dialogue between theory and cases, so 
that the iterations followed to construct the explanatory models help complement 
existing theories with the empirical information available.10 This section follows that 
practice. Taking into account the contributions of literature in the fields of law and 
politics about systems of constitutional review11, and after reading these contributions 
on the light of qualitative knowledge of the cases, the next lines present empirically-
informed theories to explain choices on models of review in the Member States of the 
EU. To do so, the section will focus on the centralized model of review, as this is the 
most frequent form of review in Europe, although the empirical section also discusses 
the models of diffuse review and parliamentary sovereignty in an inductive fashion. As 
the assumption in this article is that causation is configurational -it is the interaction 
between phenomena what usually leads to specific outcomes-, in the last part of this 
section the configurational hypotheses of the research are presented. 
  
- Post-autocratic politics. One of the hegemonic narratives in the field suggests 
that the decision to create Kelsenian-type constitutional courts has to do with the 
                                                          
10See D. Berg-Schlosser, G. De Meur, B. Rihoux, and C. Ragin. ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) as an Approach’ in: Configurational Comparative Methods eds. B. Rihoux and C. Ragin (2009) 1, 
at 6 ff. 
11 Inter alia, Shapiro, op. cit., n.7, pp.149-208.; Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.7, pp. 2744-2780.; Ramos Romeu, 
op. cit., n.2; ; Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2.  
existence authoritarian backgrounds in young democracies.12  However, 
preliminary analyses of the cases revealed that the effect of autocratic pasts is 
much weaker when such regimes were short-lived, and stronger in the cases of 
long-lasting autocracies. Existing literature has proposed a number of theories to 
account for this relation between authoritarian background and review by a 
specialized court. For some, centralized review is created in periods of transition 
to democracy, with the aim to avoid repeating the horrors committed by autocratic 
regimes and to ensure the strength of newly created democratic rule13 and the 
enforcement of individual rights.14 Ginsburg and Versteeg15  refer to this as 
ideational theory, according to which the implementation of constitutional review 
would be culturally deemed as an appropriate institutional device to prevent the 
tyranny of majority and to protect the rights of minorities and individuals. 
Ferreres16 and Ramos Romeu17 provide for another explanation. For these authors, 
political elites in transition periods have an incentive to create new constitutional 
courts in order to constraint the power of the ordinary judiciary, which might at 
this point still be loyal the previous regime. Alternatively, the post-autocratic 
theory in the European context can also be explained through what Ginsburg and 
Versteeg called diffusion though acculturation, according to which ‘states emulate 
foreign constitutional rules not because they are convinced by the intrinsic merits 
of these rules, but to gain international acceptance and legitimacy’18. From this 
perspective, the creation of Kelsenian courts could be aimed at signaling 
neighboring countries a clear commitment to democracy. Ramos Romeu mentions 
                                                          
12 Inter alia Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.7; Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, pp. 107, 110. 
13 Cappelletti and Adams, op. cit., n.4, p.1207; Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.7, p.2769) 
14 Shapiro, op. cit. n.7, pp. 153 ff. 
15 Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2 p.593. 
16  V. Ferreres Comella, ‘The European model of constitutional review of legislation: toward 
decentralization?’ (2004) 2 International J. of Constitutional Law 461, at 470. 
17 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, p.107) 
18Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2 , p.597. 
in this regard the idea of ‘imitiation of similar democratic experiences’19, which 
suggests that the implementation of constitutional courts is the result of the 
observation of successful experiences of democratic transition in other countries. 
This would show the importance of relationships between individual States when 
it comes to implementation of models of constitutional review.. 
 
- Political fragmentation. A number of authors have connected the dynamics of 
party competition with the creation of systems of review.20 Both the hegemonic 
preservation hypothesis defended by Hirschl21  and the insurance theory put 
forward by Ginsburg and Versteeg22 suggest, with only certain differences, that 
the creation of constitutional review systems could be rational for actors in power 
fearing a future defeat, so that the next government cannot make unconstrained 
decisions.23 In the same vein, Ishiyama and Ishiyama showed evidence that a 
higher number of effective parties in processes of constitution-making resulted in 
more powerful judiciaries.24 In the case of this article, these dynamics of party 
competition are particularly relevant in constitutional moments or processes of 
constitutional-amendment. While theories in the field have generally suggested 
that political fragmentation favors the creation of constitutional review, they do 
not usually clarify which specific model of review is expected to be implemented. 
However, Ramos Romeu suggests that this factor is especially apt to explain the 
                                                          
19 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, p.111. 
20 Inter alia R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (2004) ; Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, 107-108; Ginsburg 
and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2.  
21 Hirschl, id. 
22 Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2, p.594) 
23 See also Gardbaum, op. cit., n. 2, p.615) 
24 S. Ishiyama Smithey and J. Ishiyama, ‘Judicious choices: designing courts in post-communist politics’ 
(2000) 33 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 163. 
creation of Kelsenian institutions.25 For the author, constitutional courts are likely 
to arise in contexts in which the relation of forces among political elites is 
unknown and/or balanced, because these institutions act as an insurance 
mechanism. Magalhães has also suggested that high political fragmentation 
creates an incentive to opt for Kelsenian-type courts, while single-party hegemony 
creates incentives for diffuse systems of review.26 A reason for this could lie in 
the fact the Kelsenian model was designed to allow ‘opposition politicians, sitting 
in parliament or in subnational governments’ to initiate review.27 In effect, the 
centralized model usually includes ex ante and abstract control of 
constitutionality, which can be initiated at the request of opposition politicians. 
When elites in power decide to create courts to constraint future governments, it 
might be rational for them to set up institutions to which they will have easy 
access when they become the opposition, thus providing for a clear example of 
calculation of interests as a factor behind choices on models of judicial review.  
 
- Decentralization. Literature also argues that different forms of political 
devolution, decentralization or federalism create the need for a neutral third party 
to solve disputes between actors at different levels of government.28 As suggested 
by Shapiro, according to this theory, ‘federalism required some institution to 
police its complex constitutional boundary arrangements’. 29  Ramos Romeu 
explains that constitutional courts are well-suit to fulfil this function for at least 
one reason: in decentralized systems, ‘the existence of a variety of loci of power 
                                                          
25 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, p.108. 
26 P. Magalhães, ‘The Limits to Judicialization: Legislative Politics and Constitutional Review in the 
Iberian Democracies’ (2003) PhD Thesis, Ohio State University. 
27Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.7, p.2768) 
28 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, p.110; Gardbaum, op. cit., n. 2 p.614; see also Lijphart, op. cit., n.8.  
29Shapiro, op. cit., n.7, p.148) 
requires a constitutional court to authoritatively resolve issues among the organs 
of the federation and ensure legal certainty and predictability'30. In his work, 
however, the author does not find significant evidence to support this theory.31 
This research qualifies that finding, as showed in the empirical section 
 
- Institutional legacy. In some cases, the pre-existence of a certain institution may 
create an incentive to its preservation under a new political regime. Thus, the 
existence of certain forms of constitutional review in a country can be said to be 
path-dependent. According to the ‘strategic defection hypothesis’32, in certain 
circumstances, judicial actors might opt for challenging the elites of authoritarian 
regimes when they perceive that a transition towards democracy might take place 
soon. Their aim would be to gain legitimacy in order to guarantee institutional 
survival under the new regime: ‘by openly challenging elites in the endgame of 
authoritarianism, courts and judges risk the imposition of short-term costs in 
exchange for mid-term legitimacy’. Ishiyama and Ishiyama offer a different 
explanation33. In their study of post-communist judiciaries, they argue that the 
legacy of the previous regime could matter in choices in constitution-making 
processes, so that countries that had powerful judiciaries in the previous regime 
should be expected to have also powerful judiciaries in the post-communist 
period. Note that, in this case, the authors do not formulate hypotheses about the 
docile or challenging behavior of judicial actors vis-à-vis authoritarian elites, but 
                                                          
30 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2, p. 110. 
31 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2.  
32 G. Helmke,  Courts Under Constraints. Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina (2005); G. 
Helmke, ‘The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship 
and Democracy’ (2002) 96 Am. Political Science Rev. 291; see also T. Ginsburg,  ‘The Global Spread of 
Constitutional Review’, in Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, eds. K. Whittington and D. Keleman, 
(2008) 81. 
33 Ishiyama and Ishiyama, op. cit., n.24.  
only about their existence and institutional strength. With regards to the 
centralized system of review, the idea of institutional legacy defended in this 
article would pose that once a Kelsenian-style court is created in a country it will 
be difficult for political actors to eliminate the institution even in subsequent 
political regimes. This is so even in the case of façade constitutional courts in 
authoritarian regimes, which in process of transition to democracy will survive 
and be recycled into real Kelsenian courts. 
 
- Types of legal family have also been put forward as an explanation for choices 
on models of constitutional review.34  A notable feature of the empirically 
observed models of review in Europe is the wider dissemination of Kelsenian 
courts in countries of romanistic and germanistic civil law families than in 
common law and nordic civil law countries. From theoretical perspective, choices 
on models of review are deemed to be dependent on the institutional and legal-
cultural context in which they take place, and in particular on the features of the 
legal family to which the country belongs. Said in other terms, legal structures 
interact with legal and political actors creating incentives or constraints to the 
implementation of certain models of constitutional review. For some literature, 
certain legal families are more compatible with certain systems of review given 
their preexisting institutional features.35 For instance, given their reliance on a 
strict separation of powers in which courts are excluded from the lawmaking 
function, the Kelsenian model is more appropriate for civil law countries than the 
diffuse model, as the latter gives powers of review of legislation to every court in 
                                                          
34 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2.  
35 Inter aliaStone Sweet, op. cit., n.7; ; Ferreres Comella, op. cit., n.16.; Ramos Ro eu, op. cit., n.2.  
the judicial branch.36 Countries of the civil law tradition, which is at odds with the 
idea that courts should have law-making powers, will opt for centralizing review 
in one single court, of a Kelsenian style and a more political nature. The absence 
of stare decisis doctrine or the type of legal training and socialization of judges37, 
which favor legal coherence and a type of judge limited to applying the law to 
cases, are also mentioned as reasons why civil law systems are more compatible 
with models of centralized review. Another explanation is that proposed by Elkins 
and Simmons38, who talk about ‘intra-cultural diffusion through learning’, which 
some authors have interpreted as suggesting the existence of higher likelihood of 
diffusion ‘of ideas and institutions to countries that have similar characteristics 
such as language, geographic region, legal tradition and ethnic connections’.39 
This theoretical approach shows, again, how the relationships between individual 
States lead to specific outcomes. Although diffusion can operate through a 
number of mechanisms, Ginsburg and Versteeg m ntion ‘learning’ as one of the 
ways through which the generalization of certain types of constitutional review in 
certain legal cultures may operate: ‘learning entails a functional borrowing of 
constitutional provisions among states that share important pre-existing qualities, 
such as a similar legal system. Where states have information that certain 
constitutional features are successful in other states that they consider to be peers, 
they may decide to follow that example’.40   
 
                                                          
36 See Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.7.  
37  Cappelletti and Adams, op. cit., n.4, pp.1215 ff; Ferreres Comella, op. cit., n.16, p.466; Ramos Romeu, 
op. cit., n.2, p.109. 
38 Z. Elkins, and B. Simmons, ‘On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework’ (2005) 598 
Annals of the Am. Academy of Political Science 33.  
39 See A. Stroh, and C. Heyl, ‘Diffusion versus Strategic Action? The Creation of West African 
Constitutional Courts Revisited’ (2013) GIGA Research Program Working Paper 239.;Ginsburg, op. cit., 
n.32, p. 93. 
40Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2. pp.596-7. 
- Cross-fertilization and imitation. Finally, the above-mentioned theory of 
diffusion through acculturation41 has as a logical pre-requisite the existence of an 
institution to emulate. In the case of models of judicial review, the creation of the 
Austrian Constitutional Court of 1920 marks a turning point. The inclusion of 
systems of review in European post-1920 constitutions might be explained as a 
process of imitation and diffusion having Austria as the first focal point, even if 
subsequently other courts might replace the Austrian one as the most observed 
and replicated model. The Austrian Constitutional Court of 1920 was the first 
institution of this type created in the continent. For that reason, the Austrian court 
legitimized the idea of constitutional review in a region in which it was at odds 
with traditional understandings of democracy. In so doing, it opened the door to 
diffusion through imitation. Additionally, the more constitutions include 
constitutional review of legislation, the more legitimacy for this practice, and thus 
higher the incentives found by subsequent constitutions to follow the path. 
 
Some studies have tested these theories empirically. For instance, using statistical 
models, Ramous Romeu tested the impact of most of the factors outlined above and 
found evidence about their contribution to the implementation of the constitutional court 
model42. Ginsburg and Versteeg, more recently, did the same with regards to the 
adoption of constitutional review in general43. These studies, however, focused with 
only a few exceptions on the net effects of variables individually considered. Instead, 
the focus of this research is on how such factors interact in producing choices on models 
of constitutional review. To do so, this research uses QCA, which allows for a 
                                                          
41 Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2, p.597. 
42 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2. 
43 Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2. 
comprehensive analysis of the interaction among explanatory conditions. F r this 
reason, the hypotheses of this research are configurational: they focus on how different 
explanatory conditions converge in the production of a result. The usual practice in 
QCA research is the presentation of a small number of hypotheses that are particularly 
sound or relevant from a theoretical perspective.  
The configurational nature of the hypotheses is particularly useful in this paper, given 
the theoretical framework presented. Take for instance the theory according to which 
the Kelsenian model of review fits the institutional features of civil law countries better 
than those of common law ones. While this idea seems verisimilar, it must be 
confronted with the fact that actually not all civil law countries opted for this model of 
review, and hence additional conditions are required to explain the outcome. One of 
these additional conditions might be the existence of an authoritarian background. The 
shock caused by authoritarian or totalitarian experiences, especially if these were 
lasting, might have created a consensus in these countries around the need for new 
institutional arrangements to prevent authoritarian relapses. Said in different terms, in a 
certain legal-cultural area -the romano-germanic civil law one- the centralized model of 
review was assumed as a desirable institution to deal with authoritarian pasts and to 
signal a commitment to democracy. The rationality of this institutional choice was 
‘contextually rooted’, probably as a consequence of the institutional influence in this 
area of the Austrian Constitutional Court, and subsequently the German one.44 For that 
reason, the first configurational hypothesis of the research would pose that: 
 
                                                          
44 See Stone Sweet, op. cit., n.1, pp. 79 ff. 
H1. The combination of a romano-germanic civil law family with a lasting 
and consolidated authoritarian regime is sufficient for the creation of a 
system of centralized constitutional review. 
 
An alternative path to the centralized model of review deals with political de-
centralization. As suggested above, federal, devolved or decentralized political 
structures might create the need for an institution to mediate between levels of 
government. However, the implementation of a Kelsenian-style court is not 
universally regarded as the best solution for this problem, as exemplified by empirical 
cases such as contemporary United Kingdom. Therefore, the option for a Kelsenian 
court to deal with decentralized political systems is also contextual preference: in a 
given context this is deemed to be the optional solution. For the countries covered by 
this article such context is, again, that of romano-germanic legal systems, for the 
reasons presented above: patterns of institutional diffusion and adequacy of the 
institution to the underlying legal structure facilitate the implementation of this 
arrangement. For that reason: 
 
H2. The combination of a romano-germanic civil law family with a 
decentralized political system is sufficient for the implementation of a model 




DATA AND METHODS 
 
In his work on methodology of comparative law, Ran Hirschl rightly pointed at the fact 
that ‘comparative constitutional law scholarship produced by legal academics often 
overlooks (or is unaware of) basic methodological principles of controlled comparison, 
research design, and case selection’45. Bridging comparative law and politics, this article 
takes such criticism seriously, and engages with a methodology that is able to make 
causal inferences in a social-scientific manner. More particularly, the article relies on 
configurational analysis with QCA, complemented with the knowledge of the cases 
supplied by existing academic literature. While previous works in the field46  had 
approached this object of study using statistical techniques, this is to the best of this 
author’s knowledge the first study about choices on models of constitutional review 
using QCA. Given its different epistemological assumptions, QCA will allow the 
understanding of the phenomena explored from a new perspective.  
While the whole functioning of QCA cannot be explained in this short section, a few 
basic notions will be provided so that the reader can better understand the rest of this 
article.47 QCA has three peculiarities that make it particularly useful to understand the 
object of study of this article in a new light. First, the configurational approach of QCA 
allows the systematic analysis of interactions between explanatory conditions affecting 
the research outcome48, instead of their impact independently of each other. Second, 
QCA uses a deterministic rather than a probabilistic approach, in which cases are 
                                                          
45 R. Hirschl, ‘On the blurred methodological matrix of comparative constitutional law’ in The Migration 
of Constitutional Ideas, ed. Sujit Choudhry (2006) 39, at 39. 
46 Ramos Romeu, op. cit., n.2; Ginsburg and Versteeg, op. cit., n. 2. 
47 Readers willing to learn more about the method can check, inter alia, C. Ragin, Fuzzy Set Social 
Science (2000); C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (2008); B. Rihoux and C. 
Ragin, Configurational Comparative Methods (2009). 
48  Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, Rihoux and Ragin, op. cit., n.10, p. 8. 
understood as specific combinations of factors that tell us a specific story about 
causation in every particular instance. Third, rather than analyzing the correlations 
between two variables, QCA analyses the relations of necessity and sufficiency between 
explanatory conditions and the outcomes of the research.49 QCA thus provides for a 
different approach to causation. Additionally, given those characteristics of QCA, the 
small number of cases for each outcome and their idiosyncratic features are not a 
problem when performing the analyses, since the methodology is particularly well-
suited to deal with objects of study of such nature.  
This research has opted for the crisp set variety of QCA, in which the explanatory 
conditions take dichotomous values. The outcome of the research was operationalized 
into three categories: review by a specialized court, review by the judicial branch and 
parliamentary sovereignty. A crisp set QCA analysis was performed for each of these 
outcomes. The use in each of the analyses of 6 crisp conditions for 28 cases minimizes 
the risk of randomly obtaining a contradiction-free model50, in line with the best 
practices in QCA. 
Methodological literature has put forward some criticisms of QCA methods, which 
configurational methodologists have addressed, inter alia, through the creation of 
standards of good practice. This article follows such standards of good practice. 
Literature has alerted about the ‘case-sensitive’ nature of QCA –a small variation in one 
case can lead to different results- and, in relation to this, about the risks involved in 
dichotomization in csQCA.51 To deal with these issues, the best practices in the use of 
QCA recommend transparency and justification in the choice of cases and in the 
                                                          
49 Rihoux and Ragin, op. cit., n.47. 
50  A. Marx, ‘Crisp-Set Qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) and model specification: Benchmarks 
for future csQCA applications’ (2010) 4 International J. of Multiple Research Approaches 138. 
51 J.H. Goldthorpe, ‘Current issues in comparative macrosociology: A debate on methodological issues’, 
(1997) 16 Comparative Social Research 1. 
operationalization of the phenomena.52 This is provided in this article in this section and 
in the final Appendix. In fact, the case-sensitive nature of QCA is not a problem, but 
rather an advantage, for a research like this. As said by De Meur et al. “case-sensitivity 
allows the investigator to discover, via QCA, all possible explanations, whether 
frequent or not”53. This is especially important for this article: existing literature had put 
forward, through statistical analysis, general causal correlations explaining choices on 
models of constitutional review. These findings are essential to our understanding of 
this object of study. But QCA will allow the uncovering of interactions of explanatory 
conditions for each of the cases covered by the research. 
Regarding case selection, this article identifies necessary and sufficient conditions 
leading to choices on models of constitutional review in all current constitutional 
systems of the EU-28 (including the UK). The selection of the EU Member States is 
justified for their relative homogeneity of background conditions. Good practices in the 
use of QCA require the use of cases that are as homogeneous as possible in terms of the 
conditions not included in the model, while at the same time diverse with regards to the 
conditions included.54 Member States of the EU guaranteed such homogeneity for a 
number of reasons. To start with, they belong to the same world region and the same 
integration organization. Secondly, membership of that organization, the EU, requires 
the acceptance of common rules and principles, including the market economy, respect 
for democracy and human rights, and acceptance of a common set of legislation and 
judicial decisions called acquis communautaire. Thirdly, acceptance of the rules of the 
EU implies acceptance of the review powers of the Court of Justice of the European 
                                                          
52  C. Schneider and C. Wagemann, ‘Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
Fuzzy-Sets’ (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology 1. 
53 G. De Meur, B. Rihoux, and S. Yamasaki,. ‘Addressing the Critiques of QCA’. in Configurational 
Comparative Methods, eds. B. Rihoux and C. Ragin (2009)147, at. 156. 
54 Id. p. 157. 
Union, whose capacity to review the conformity of legislation on the light of the treaties 
of the EU interacts with the institutions of constitutional review of the Member States.  
 
In QCA, the analysis of necessary conditions aims at showing which events must occur 
for the outcome to occur, even if they do not guarantee the occurrence of the outcome.55 
The analysis of sufficient conditions complements the former, by showing which 
conditions –or combinations of conditions- are sufficient to produce the outcome.56 In 
the analysis of sufficient conditions the configurational nature of QCA is particularly 
important, as the causal paths usually display combinations of conditions which are 
separately insufficient but jointly sufficient to explain the outcome.57 In order to carry 
out the analysis of sufficient conditions, QCA first constructs a Truth Table out of the 
data matrix. The Truth Table contains all combinations of explanatory conditions (see 
Appendix for the Truth Tables of this article), including those without empirical cases 
(called ‘logical remainders’). Subsequently, QCA proceeds to ‘Boolean minimization’, 
by which redundant conditions are dropped in order to attain a more parsimonious 
solution. 
This article uses the intermediate solution of the analysis of sufficient conditions, 
capable of providing for parsimony without over-simplifying the results through the use 
of only certain logical remainders.58 In the analyses, coverage scores indicate the share 
of all the cases with the outcome of interest that the solution can account for59, and 
consistency scores indicate the share of cases covered by the solution that actually have 
                                                          
55 Berg-Schlosser, de Meur, Rihoux and Ragin, op. cit., n.10,  pp.9-10. 
56 Id., pp.10-11. 
57 Id., pp.8 ff. 
58 C. Ragin and J. Sonnett, ‘Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, Counterfactual 
Cases and Comparative Analysis’ (2004) Compasss Working Paper Series: 
59  B. Rihoux, and G. De Meur,  ‘Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)’ in 
Configurational Comparative Methods, eds. B. Rihoux and C. Ragin (2009) 33, at. 64. 
the outcome which the analyses aimed at explaining.60 Higher consistency and coverage 
scores indicate a more solid solution. Presence of a condition is expressed with the 
name of a condition in lower case (‘condition’), and absence of a condition is expressed 
with the name of the condition in lower case preceded by the symbol ‘~’ (‘~condition’). 
The symbol ‘*’ represents logical ‘and’, meaning that two conditions must be 
combined. 
To construct reliable models this article followed several iterations, although two main 
phases can be identified. In a first phase, a theoretical framework and an empirical 
model focusing on centralized constitutional review were constructed. The focus on this 
type of review was the original aim of the article. However, in a second stage it was 
observed that the configurational analyses could also provide for insights regarding the 
model of diffuse review and the model of parliamentary sovereignty, so these were 
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Table 1. Sources and calibration 
Condition Source Calibration 
Outcome 1 Official websites 1: Specialized court 
0: All other 
Outcome 2 Official websites 1: Parliamentary sovereignty 
0: All other 
Outcome 3 Official websites 1: Review by the judicial branch 
0: All other 
Decentralization Regional Authority Index 
(UNC/VUA) 
1: RAI score > 10  




Transitional Justice and 
Memory in the EU 
(CSIC) 
1: auth. regime > 10 consecutive 
years 
0: auth. regime =< 10 
consecutive years 
Legal family Zweigert and Kötz 
(1998). Research on 
individual cases. 
1: Romanistic OR Germanic 
0: Nordic OR Anglo-American 
Political 
fragmentation 
Research on individual 
cases. 
1: No absolute majority of votes 
0: Absolute majority of votes or 




Research on individual 
cases. 
1: CC existed in previous regime 
0: CC did not exist  
Imitation Research on individual 
cases. 
1: Constitution was enacted after 
creation of Austrian 
Constitutional Court. 
0: Constitution pre-dates the 
Austrian CC. 
 
Table 1 describes the conditions of the research, the source of information used and the 
calibration followed. As indicated, comprehensive sources of information existed for 
some conditions, but for others data had to be obtained after a detailed research on 
official websites and secondary literature. Table 1 also presents the calibration rules for 
the conditions. Following the best practices in QCA, calibration was based on 
theoretical reasons and on the dialogue with the cases, and it is transparently and 
exhaustively discussed in the next lines.  
For the outcome, the current model of constitutional review of each country was taken 
into account. It is worth noting that any taxonomy of systems of constitutional review 
will always be based on ideal types and that definitions will always be contestable. At 
the same time, note also that empirical institutions register a wide variation, including 
forms of institutional hybridity. For the purposes of this article, a centralized system of 
review will be one in which one single ad hoc judicial-type institution has the capacity 
to annul legislation erga omnes; a diffuse system of review will be one in which the 
power to annul legislation is bestowed to the organs of the judicial branch; and a system 
of parliamentary sovereignty will be one in which legislation of the parliament cannot 
be annulled by a national court. 
For the rest of conditions, the moment of creation of the current model of constitutional 
review was generally taken into account as a reference to gather the data, unless 
otherwise indicated and justified. This moment is, in most cases, the moment of creation 
of the constitution, unless the current system of review was created afterwards. For 
political fragmentation, dichotomizations accounted for the existence of one party with 
absolute majority of votes at the time of creation of the current system of review. Those 
cases in which the system of review –or lack thereof- was created long before the birth 
of modern parliamentary/electoral systems scored 0. For legal families, the well-known 
classification in four families created by Zweigert and Kötz61 was used, and a crisp set 
was created to account for cases which belonged to the romanistic or the germanistic 
family. The dichotomization point for the decentralization crisp set was of 10 Regional 
Authority Index points; this point theoretically marks the transition toward substantial 
decentralization, and allowed a sufficient variation within cases. For authoritarian pasts, 
a crisp set was created accounting for cases that had authoritarian regimes for more than 
ten consecutive years, i.e. lasting and consolidated authoritarianisms. This calibration 
allowed the exclusion of countries whose authoritarian regimes were short-lived or 
discontinuous, for which the preliminary analyses showed that the incentive to 
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implement specialized courts was notably lower. The source of information was the 
Database ‘Transitional Justice in the EU’ of CSIC,62 although this was double checked 
and corrected when necessary with the ‘Institutionalized Autocracy (AUTOC)’ variable 
of Polity IV.63 For pre-existing constitutional court, it was taken into account whether 
such an institution existed in the immediately previous regime, regardless of whether 
that was a democracy or an authoritarian regime with a façade constitutional court. 
Finally, the existence of a model to imitate was operationalized so it could reflect the 
impact of a specific event, the creation of the first Constitutional Court in Austria in 
1920. Constitutions enacted before this event scored 0, and those enacted or deeply 
reformed64  after this event scored 1, regardless of the system of review they 
implemented. In this way, the condition could show the importance of the existence of 
precedents of constitutional review in processes of cross-national institutional diffusion 
without creating endogeneity65. To allow replicability, and for the sake of transparency, 
the data matrix as well as the Truth Tables are provided in the Appendix. 
For the outcome, although most cases were relatively uncontroversial, some countries 
were difficult to classify. Despite its sui generis nature66, the French Constitutional 
Council was coded as a Kelsenian-type institution. In Malta ordinary courts can perform 
judicial review functions, but there exists a Constitutional Court with the last word on 
constitutionality matters whose decisions are binding erga omnes, and which has a 
                                                          
62 Transitional Justice in the EU, <http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/transitionaljustice/home>  
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<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html> 
64 Only major constitutional amendments, equating to a de facto new constitution, were taken into account 
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account the date of creation of the constitution, the problem disappears: not all constitutions post-dating 
the creation of the Austrian Constitutional Court included Kelsenian courts, while constitutions pre-dating 
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66 See A. Stone Sweet, A., The Birth of Judicial Politics in France. The Constitutional Council in 
Comparative Perspective (1992). 
monopoly on the assessment of political issues such as the validity of elections67 so this 
hybrid case was classified also as one of specialized court. In Ireland and Cyprus 
constitutional review is monopolized by certain institutions, but these are the higher 
courts of the judiciary (the Supreme Court in both countries and, in Ireland, also the 
High Court) so the cases were coded as cases of review in the judicial branch. The same 
coding was used for Finland, because the country has now abandoned the model of pure 
parliamentary sovereignty and recently its courts have been bestowed with certain 
powers of review.68 The most difficult cases were Estonia and Luxembourg, as these 
were cases of complete hybridity. For these two cases there were only two options: 
excluding them from the sample to ensure uncontroversial results, or assigning them 
contestable but theoretically justified scores and, admitting their contestability, provide 
for additional qualitative discussion which could account for their specificity. Opting 
for comprehensiveness, the second strategy was preferred. In Estonia there is no 
constitutional court. However, like in Kelsenian systems, constitutional review is 
essentially centralized in a Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 
certain political actors have standing befor  the chamber, and the institution can 
exercise abstract and ex ante review.69 Estonia was thus included in the group of 
countries with review by a specialized court. The case of Luxembourg is even more 
difficult. Traditionally a country based on the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, in 
1996 an institution named ‘Constitutional Court’ was created. However, despite its 
name, the institution is largely dissimilar from Kelsenian-type institutions. Only 
ordinary courts (and not political actors or citizens) can raise questions before it, the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court only bind the referring court and, most 
                                                          
67 CECC/Conference of European Constitutional Courts, Report on the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Malta (2002). 
68 De Visser, op. cit., n.4, p.77; Gardbaum, op. cit., n. 2, p.623. 
69 N. Maveety, and V. Pettai, ‘Government Lawyers and Non-Judicial Constitutional Review in Estonia’ 
(2005) 57 Europe-Asia Studies 93, at 99. 
importantly, it has in fact no capacity to annul legislation erga omnes70, which is the 
defining feature of Kelsenian courts. The case of Luxembourg is in fact a hybrid of 
Kelsenian model and parliamentary sovereignty, but in the absence of capacity to annul 
legislation erga omnes it has been coded as a very special instance of the latter. In ny 
case, the empirical section analyses this case in more detail, acknowledging its special 
and hybrid nature. Take into account, additionally, that the other two countries 
classified as of parliamentary sovereignty are also no longer pure types of this approach; 
for instance, in the UK, the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights has 
introduced a modicum of constitutional review in the country, although the parliament 
continues to have the last say on constitutional matters. Additionally, the powers of 
abstract review of the UK Supreme Court on devolution matters71 add an element of 
hybridity to the approach to constitutional review in this country. Regarding the legal 
families condition, it was observed that a number of countries had been influenced by 
different legal traditions. However, in most of these cases the two legal families 
converging in the same country were the romanistic and the germanistic, so the problem 
became irrelevant as the QCA analyses grouped these families into one single condition. 
The only country in which that was not the case was Malta, which had both strong civil 
law and common law influence. The country was classified as a romanistic country.72 
For the cases in which assignment of scores was hybrid or unclear (for any of the 
conditions or for the outcome), detailed explanation and analysis accounting for their 
specific nature is provided in the empirical section.  
 
                                                          
70  Ferreres Comella, op. cit., n.4, p. 168; P. Popelier, P. and W. Voermans, ‘Europeanization, 
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1. Analysis of necessary conditions 
 
The analysis of necessary conditions shows which conditions must be always present 
(or absent) for the outcome to occur, even if their presence (or absence) might be alone 
insufficient for the occurrence of the outcome. In general, it is considered that for a 
condition to be ‘necessary’ it must have a consistency higher than 0.9, although a very 
strict definition of necessity would raise the threshold to 1. Table 2 indicates in bold 
every instance in which this requirement is met. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of necessary conditions 









decentralization 0.263158 0.625000 0.166667 0.125000 0.666667 0.250000 
~decentralization 0.736842 0.700000 0.833333 0.250000 0.333333 0.050000 
authoritarian 0.789474 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
~authoritarian 0.210526 0.307692 1.000000 0.461538 1.000000 0.230769 
romanogermanic 1.000000 0.863636 0.166667 0.045455 0.666667 0.090909 
~romanogermanic 0.000000 0.000000 0.833333 0.833333 0.333333 0.166667 
politfrag 0.894737 0.739130 0.833333 0.217391 0.333333 0.043478 
~politfrag 0.105263 0.400000 0.166667 0.200000 0.666667 0.400000 
postaustriancc 0.894737 0.739130 1.000000 0.260870 0.000000 0.000000 
~postaustriancc 0.105263 0.400000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.600000 
preexistingcc 0.210526 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
~preexistingcc 0.789474 0.625000 1.000000 0.250000 1.000000 0.125000 
 
 
As showed in Table 2, for the outcome ‘specialized courts’ the only necessary condition 
was membership of a case in the group of countries of a romano-germanic civil law 
tradition, which also has a high coverage. This seems to confirm the theory that 
institutional diffusion operates more easily within relatively homogeneous cultural 
areas, to the point that the institutional settings common to those areas are necessary for 
the implementation of Kelsenian courts. Note that Ramos Romeu focuses on the 
distinction between common law and civil law families.73 However, the analysis in this 
paper shows that the results are more fine-grained if the very sui-generis Scandinavian 
legal tradition is separated from the other civil law families. The analysis of sufficient 
conditions, showed below, confirmed this finding. 
For other outcomes, some conditions displayed also a high consistency score. For 
countries in which constitutional review was entrusted to the judicial branch there were 
three necessary conditions: the absence of a lasting and continuous authoritarian 
experience, the absence of a previous constitutional court, and the fact that the 
constitution of the country was enacted after the creation of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court of 1920. For the system of parliamentary sovereignty, conditions with a high 
consistency score included the absence of a preexisting constitutional court, the 
enactment of the constitution before the creation of the first system of review in Europe 
with the Austrian constitution of 1920, and the absence of a lasting authoritarian 
experience. However, in the case of all of these conditions, coverage scores were 
notably lower, which suggests that any conclusions to be drawn from these findings 
should be taken more cautiously. 
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2. Analysis of sufficient conditions for ‘specialized court’ 
 
The analysis of sufficient conditions shows which combinations of conditions are 
sufficient to produce the outcome, even if separately these conditions are insufficient to 
cause it. Following the theoretical framework, all the conditions were expected to 
contribute to the outcome when present. When constructing the Truth Table (see 
Appendix) it was observed that there were no logical contradictions, which pointed to 
the robustness of the model. When asked to select prime implicants, all are marked.  
 
Table 3. Intermediate solution for ‘review by specialized court’ 







0.789474 0.105263 1.000000 Bul, Cro, Cz, 
Est, Ger, Hu, 
It, Lat, Lit, Pl, 





0.789474 0.105263 1.000000 Bul, Cro, Cz, 
Est, Fr, Ger, 
It, Lat, Lit, 





0.210526 0.105263 1.000000 At, Be, Ger, 
Spa 
 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
The model in Table 3 displayed three different causal paths, covering together all the 
countries with Kelsenian or similar systems of review (coverage: 1) and exclusively 
countries with this type of system of review (consistency: 1). It is worth noting that the 
condition ‘preexistence of the institution’ disappeared after Boolean minimization, 
which means that it was not logically relevant to the model. 
All the paths included as a condition the membership to romano-germanic legal 
families, which is consistent with the analysis of necessary conditions displayed earlier 
and with the theoretical framework set above.74 Furthermore, it is telling that the main 
cases of hybridity in the models of constitutional review are also the cases in which 
other influences apart from the romano-germanic were present. In Malta ordinary courts 
can perform review functions, but at the same time there is a Constitutional Court 
whose final say is binding erga omnes and monopolizes some politics-related 
functions.75 Revealingly, Malta had clear common law influences in addition to civil 
law ones, having gained full independence from the United Kingdom only in 1964. Also 
in Estonia, the choice for a Constitutional Review Chamber instead of a purely 
Kelsenian institution has been explained by some authors as a possible result of the 
Scandinavian influence.76 The cases of Malta and Estonia are literally the exceptions 
that prove the rule, as they provide for complementary evidence that institutional 
diffusion within areas of influence or legal-cultural traditions is a major factor 
explaining choices on models of review. 
However, important as it might be, it must be kept in mind that the ‘romano-germanic’ 
condition was, alone, never sufficient to produce the outcome. Said in other terms, the 
type of legal family matters, but only when it is combined with other factors. In the first 
path it had to be combined with the existing precedent of the Austrian Constitutional 
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75 CECC/Conference of European Constitutional Courts, op. cit. n.67 
76  See G. Brunner, ‘Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judiciary’, in 
Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, eds. L. Sólyom and 
G. Brunner (2000) 65, at 94; K. Kovács and G.A. Tóth, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Transformation’ 
(2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Rev. 183, at 184.
Court and with the transition from a lasting authoritarian regime towards democracy. 
This path, which is similar albeit not identical to the first research hypothesis, can 
explain almost 80 per cent of the cases, although its overlap with other paths is very 
high (unique coverage: 0.1). The most likely explanation for this combination is that 
constitution-makers in democratic transitions decided to follow the Austrian model 
because a wide-spread belief existed in the context of the romano-germanic area that 
this institution could signal a clear commitment to democracy and/or could be useful to 
prevent an authoritarian relapse. Signaling and ideational theories find further support in 
the work of Cappelletti and Adams77, which suggested that post-war Italy and Germany 
seek the creation of a ‘new high-ranking and prestigious organ’ to control the 
government. Also referring to the German case, Schoenberger  shows that the 
constitution drafters were overwhelmingly concerned with human rights and dignity as 
a reaction to the Nazi period.78 In the Polish case, Garlicki points at the weight of the 
experiences in two neighboring countries: ‘Germany, due to its geographical proximity 
and its traditional influence on Polish scholars, and Spain, due to its successful (and 
peaceful) departure from an authoritarian rule’.79  
In the second path in Table 3, countries also belonged to the romano-germanic tradition 
and could follow the precedent of the Austrian Constitutional Court, but unlike in the 
first path the additional relevant condition was now the high political fragmentation and 
electoral competitiveness at the moment of creation of the system of review (no party 
with absolute majority of votes). The interaction between explanatory conditions points 
here at the idea that, in romano-germanic countries, political fragmentation created a 
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79 L. Garlicki, ‘Constitutional Court of Poland’ in: The Political Origins of Constitutional Courts, eds. P. 
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strong incentive to the implementation of the Kelsenian model inaugurated by Austria. 
The combination of these three conditions, rather than their separate effect, explains the 
outcome. Literature on the individual cases confirms the importance of party dynamics 
in the establishment of centralized models of review, as suggested by this path. For the 
Polish case, Garlicki stated that political fragmentation and the idea of the insurance 
function could have played a role when, in 1997, a new Constitution was passed 
reforming the already existing court.80 France is also part of this path. However, the 
French Constitutional Council was one of the difficult cases, since especially at the 
moment of its creation it was very different from typical Kelsenian courts. The sui 
generis nature of the Council might be explained by some specificities of its context of 
creation. Note that the general theory is that fragmented constituent assemblies have an 
incentive to create Kelsenian courts, but also that this theory implicitly assumes a 
parliamentary model in which the assembly is the actor in control of the process of 
constitution-drafting. Although it is true that the French parliament was fragmented in 
1958, a special feature of the case might have had an important role in the design of the 
Council: the de facto hegemony of the De Gaulle and his exceptional dominance over 
the constitution-making process. Thus, political calculations of interests also seem to 
explain this case, but in a different way: precisely because of parliamentary 
fragmentation, De Gaulle created an institution which he could keep under his 
command. According to Stone Sweet ‘General De Gaulle and his agents established a 
quasi-Bonapartist institution, the Constitutional Council, as a means of ensuring 
executive control over the legislature’.81 In fact, the Council was born with very limited 
powers of review, and for more than a decade was tightly subject to the authority of the 
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executive.82 The powers of the Council, however, expanded over time. In 1974, the 
institution was reformed to give standing to 60 members of any chamber of the 
parliament, thus providing opposition parties with access to the institution and making 
the Council more similar to usual counter-majoritarian Kelsenian courts. Troper83 and 
Pasquino84 explicitly stated that the 1974 reform fully validates Ginsburg’s ‘insurance 
theory’, as it was implemented as a form of protection of politicians in power against 
future political majorities.  
 
In the third path, countries of the romano-germanic legal families had a sufficient level 
of political fragmentation and a high level of decentralization, these two later factors 
creating an incentive to the creation of Kelsenian courts in the context of legal families 
that were compatible with it. Again, this path is similar but not identical to the second 
research hypothesis. Unlike in the former paths, the existence of the Austrian precedent 
was not logically relevant for the production of the outcome in this one. More 
importantly, this is the only path in which decentralization plays any role at all. And 
tellingly, this path has the lowest raw coverage, as it has the potential to explain only 21 
per cent of cases. This could be thought to confirm the findings by Ginsburg and 
Versteeg85 and Ramos Romeu86 that decentralization is not that important to explain 
judicial review after all. This idea should however be taken cautiously, as for at least 
two countries, Austria and Belgium, this condition turned out to be essential in its 
combination with other factors. Existing literature seems to confirm this idea in both 
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instances. Cappelletti and Adams recall that the 1920 Austrian constitution already gave 
the Länder governments and the federal government the capacity to raise questions 
before the court against each other.87 Gardbaum explicitly claims that decentralization is 
a major force explaining the creation in Belgium of the Court of Arbitration, which later 
extended its powers and became the Belgian Constitutional Court.88 A similar position 
is defended by Popelier and Voermans with regards the Belgian case.89 Additionally, 
some information points at the importance of decentralization even for some cases 
which can be explained also by other paths. A good example is that of Germany, for 
which Schöenberger mentions ‘the importance of federalism’90 as one the driving forces 
behind the introduction of constitutional review.  
 
3. Analysis of sufficient conditions for ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ 
 
For the analysis of sufficient conditions for models of parliamentary sovereignty, the 
same conditions as in the previous subsection were used, although the assumptions 
about their causal impact were exactly the opposite: now all conditions were expected to 
contribute to the outcome when absent. Again, a contradiction-free Truth Table was 
obtained (see Appendix). When asked to select prime implicants, a conservative 
approach was followed and all were marked. After Boolean minimization it was 
obtained a model with perfect coverage (1.0) and consistency (1.0) scores, which was 
composed by two causal paths (Table 4).  
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90 Schoenberger, op. cit., n.78, p.82. 
 
Table 4. Intermediate solution for ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ 












0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 Lux 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
  
As seen in Table 4, countries in which the model of parliamentary sovereignty survived 
had in common a convergence of absences: all conditions that could have led to the 
implementation of constitutional review are absent, interacting with each other in 
permitting the exceptional survival of a model of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The two paths in the model have in common that in those countries a precedent of a 
Kelsenian institution had never existed, as in fact their constitutions preexisted the 
creation of the first system of constitutional review in Europe. They also have in 
common that they did not experience authoritarian regimes, or did only for less than ten 
consecutive years. The first path covers the UK and The Netherlands. Their 
constitutions are particularly old (in the case of the UK, according to some definitions, 
the oldest in the world), preexisted the creation of the first systems of review, and were 
enacted at a time that precedes modern dynamics of electoral competition. This explains 
why a system of constitutional review was not implemented in the first place. The fact 
that these countries did not suffer totalitarian or authoritarian regimes (UK) or did so for 
a short period of time and as a result of an invasion (The Netherlands) would explain 
the lack of incentives to implement such system at a later stage. Note also that political 
decentralization is irrelevant to this path. This would explain why the process of 
devolution in the UK or decentralization in The Netherlands have not so far lead to the 
substitution of the model of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The second path covers only Luxembourg, showing the very idiosyncratic nature of this 
case. In this country a Constitutional Court was created in 1996 but, given the fact that 
it had no general powers to annul legislation erga omnes, it was classified as a special 
type of system of parliamentary sovereignty. The model in Table 4 shows that this 
country actually met a number of conditions that theoretically should have driven to 
perfect (as opposed to hybrid) parliamentary sovereignty. The counter-intuitive creation 
of the Constitutional Court has been analyzed in detail by some literature. Everything 
points at it being the result of a case-specific factor: a decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights that questioned the impartiality of the Conseil d’État.91 To deal with this 
decision, Luxembourg decided in 1996 to create its Constitutional Court, but in line 
with the general conditions of the country showed in the path, it was bestowed with 
very limited powers of review, no standing for political actors and, more importantly, 
unlike Kelsenian courts, with no real capacity to annul of legislation with a binding 




4. Analysis of sufficient conditions for ‘review by the judicial branch’ 
                                                          
91 Gardbaum, op. cit. 2, p.622. 
92 Popelier and Voermans, op. cit., n.70, p.96. 
 
The last analysis of sufficient conditions explains the cases in which judicial review is 
entrusted to the judicial branch. When introducing the six conditions in the analysis, a 
contradiction-free Truth Table is obtained. When asked to select prime implicants, again 
a conservative strategy is followed and all are marked. All conditions are deemed to 
contribute to the outcome when absent. The intermediate solution displays three paths 
and perfect solution coverage and consistency scores (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Intermediate solution for ‘review by the judicial branch’ 




















0.166667 0.166667 1.000000 Gre 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
 
The first two paths in Table 5 cover exactly the same countries (Cyprus, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark and Ireland) which are overdetermined, although the first path seems 
theoretically more solid. Both paths have in common the absence of some of the key 
conditions leading to the implementation of a Kelsenian system: absence of a precedent 
of system of centralized review, absence of romanogermanic legal system and absence 
of a lasting authoritarian regime. However, as suggested in the first path, the 
constitutions of these countries were enacted at a time when constitutional review had 
already some precedents in the continent. This might have created an incentive for these 
countries to implement a system of review, albeit different from the Kelsenian model 
that was spreading in romanogermanic countries. 
 
The last path in Table 5 covers Greece. In this path we also find the absence of several 
of the conditions that lead to Kelsenian systems. One of them is political fragmentation, 
whose absence is also part of the configuration. In that regard, Magalhaes explains that 
for the Greek case, it was precisely the dominance of the New Democracy Party (with 
70% of seats on the assembly) what lead the country to a system of concrete and diffuse 
review, unlike countries with a similar legal family and authoritarian legacies: ‘Unlike 
those in Spain or Portugal, the Greek constituent process was dominated by a single 
party, Constantine Karamanlis's New Democracy. ND enjoyed more than 70 percent of 
seats in the assembly, and did not have to worry about elections following the approval 
of the new Constitution. The result was that Greece, with similar authoritarian and civil 
law legacies and involved in an almost simultaneous democratic transition, remained 
the only new Southern European democracy without constitutional review of 
legislation. Instead, it returned to the pre-dictatorship system of concrete and diffuse 
judicial review, and created only a Special Highest Court (SHC) in charge of settling 
controversies between the highest courts in the land (the Council of State, the Areos 
Pagos, and the Court of Auditors) concerning concrete review decisions, composed 
mainly of career judges enjoying reduced independence from the executive’.93 The 
configurational nature of choices on models of constitutional review is, again, clear 
                                                          
93 Magalhães, op. cit., n.26, p.127. 
here: having a romano-germanic legal family or an authoritarian past is not enough to 
implement a constitutional court. The Greek case illustrates that these conditions do not 
suffice for this outcome, even combined, unless there is also a sufficient political 
fragmentation in the country. 
 
The model, however, provides for some interesting evidence that questions the role that 
existing literature has attributed to party hegemony in the choices for systems of review. 
While the path of Greece shows the importance of lack of political fragmentation for the 
implementation of a system of review by the judicial branch, the second path indicates 
that its presence might have a similar effect. This paradox might be explained by two 
factors. On the one hand, cases in the second path are overdetermined, so it could 
simply be that the first path is a better explanation for them. On the other hand, political 
fragmentation (and its absence) is combined with different conditions in the different 
paths. In any case, the model provides for an interesting puzzle that future research will 




This article has explained institutional choices on contemporary models of 
constitutional review in the countries of the EU. The findings of the research point 
towards an interesting form of ‘contextual rationality’ as an explanation for these 
choices: a type of reasoning as to what arrangement is best which depends on specific 
contexts, such as specific types of legal family. Furthermore, this contextual rationality 
could be comprehended thanks to the configurational approach followed by the article. 
In the case of Kelsenian-style systems of review, the findings suggested that these were 
implemented in countries with a romano-germanic legal family, but only in combination 
with conditions such as a high political fragmentation or a lasting authoritarian 
experience. This type of legal family, thus, could be understood as a fertile ground for 
the dissemination of the Kelsenian model, although these types of courts were only 
implemented in these countries when other triggering factors were also present. Such 
findings confirmed the research hypotheses, although adding further complexity to 
them. 
Similar was the case of the other approaches to constitutional review, whose 
implementation could only be understood in configurational terms. The survival of the 
system of parliamentary sovereignty is explained in this paper as the result of the joint 
absence of the factors that could have created an incentive to the implementation of 
constitutional review. And the system of diffuse review, generally, as the result of a 
period in which constitutional review is mainstreaming in Europe, albeit in countries 
where the Kelsenian model was a less likely option –f r instance, because they were not 
based on romano-germanic legal families-. The configurational approach taken by this 
paper, thus, complements existing research in the field and helps us see the determinants 
of approaches to constitutional review from a new, different angle. 
While this article has focused on the current systems of constitutional review of EU 
Member States, its findings have the capacity to shed light over other cases in different 
periods or geographical locations. For instance, the model seems able to clarify the 
reasons behind the creation of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees of the 1931 
Second Spanish Republic. In line with the findings of this article, that institution was 
created by a post-1920 constitution in a civil law country undergoing a process of 
decentralization and with a fragmented constitutional assembly. The evidence found by 
this article probably also has much to tell about the traditional approach to diffuse 
review in Iceland, which despite not being a Member State of the EU shares similar 
features with Sweden, Denmark and Finland. This capacity of the models to shed light 
on cases beyond the sample of the article points at the strength of its findings. 
The normative debate on the merits of constitutional review will continue to permeate 
literature about these institutions. On the one hand, arrangements for constitutional 
review constrain democratically-elected political actors when pursuing their preferences 
and goals. On the other hand, these institutions are deemed to be essential for the 
protection of the rule of law and democracy in countries where they exist. However, the 
implementation of models of constitutional review is often the result of factors that go 
beyond these normative considerations, even if democratic concerns still play a role in 
their creation. In shedding light over those factors, I hope to have contributed with 
empirical evidence to the important debates taking place in the field about the rationales 









In order to meet the best practices in the use of QCA, this Appendix provide for 
information about the Truth Tables and data matrix used to perform the analysis. 
Truth Table for Presence of Special Court 












0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 1 1 1 1 0 8 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 


















Truth Table for Presence of Parliamentary Sovereignty 












0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 









Truth Table for Presence of Review by Judicial Branch 












0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 0 1 1 0 4 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 1 1 1 1 0 8 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of cases: 1. Consistency cutoff: 0.99 
 
csQCA Data Matrix 
Case spec_court jud_branch parlm_sover Decentralizatio authoritarian10 Romanogermanic politfrag postaustriancc prexistingcc 
AT 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
BE 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
BUL 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
CRO 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
CY 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
CZ 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
DK 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
EST 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
FI 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
FR 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
GER 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
GRE 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
HU 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
IRL 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
IT 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
LAT 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
LIT 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
LUX 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
MT 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
NL 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
PL 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
PT 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
RO 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
SK 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
SL 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
SPA 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SWE 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
UK 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Raw data for quantitative phenomena dichotomized into crisp sets 







Years authoritariansm  
Crisp Set 
Share of votes of most voted party 
Crisp Set 
AT 21,00 1 7 0 40.8% 1 
BE 28,95 1 4 0 19.5% 1 
BUL 1 0 44 1 47% 1 






56% for Patriotic Front in Greek 
Community, but all seats in 
Turkish community go to CTNU  1 
CZ 0 0 41 1 29.7% 1 
DK 6,1 0 5 0 40% 1 
EST 0 0 1+3+47 1 41% 1 
FI 7,1 0 0 0 29% 1 






Drafted by parliamentary council, 





periods, none of them 




HU 10,9 1 45 1 52% 0 
IRL 0 0 0 0 47% 1 
IT 10 0 21 1 35% 1 






Majority (not absolute) for 
independent candidates in 1990 
elections to Supreme Soviet 1 
LUX 0 0 4 0 30% 1 






System created in 1848, not 
comparable to modern elections 0 
PL 3 0 45 1 20% 1 
PT 3,6 0 48 1 48% 1 
RO 6 0 4+44 1 67% 0 
SK 0 0 45 1 37% 1 
SL 0 0 24+4+45 1 17.3% 1 
SPA 12,1 1 39 1 34% 1 
SWE 12 1 0 0 35% 1 
UK 10,5 1 0 0 Evolutive constitutionalism. 0 
 
 
 
